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503(b)(9) Claimants - The New Constituent, a/k/a "the 500
Pound Gorilla," at the Table
Judith Greenstone Miller & Jay L. Welford*l, 2
I. INTRODUCTION
The Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act
of 2005 ("BAPCPA") 3 established a new administrative priority claim
under Section 503(b)(9) of the Bankruptcy Code, Title 11, §§ 101, et
seq. ("Code") for those creditors that provide goods to a debtor in the
ordinary course of business within 20 days prior to the commence-
ment of the case. The legislative history surrounding this section is
scant, but presumably Congress was concerned about providing a ve-
hicle to enhance payment to creditors that shipped goods to a debtor
in the ordinary course of business on the eve of bankruptcy. Accord-
ing to Collier's:
The ostensible reason for according administrative priority to such
obligations was to prevent debtors from acquiring goods at a time
where the debtor knew that bankruptcy was imminent and that the
debtor would not be able to pay for such goods.
COLLIER'S ON BANKRUPTCY 503.16[1] at 503-79 (15th ed. rev.).
Colliers goes on to state that the provision, while well intentioned,
provides unequal treatment to similarly situated creditors:
The addition of this provision represents a dramatic departure from
bankruptcy precedent. It is also likely to lead to disparate treat-
ment of otherwise similarly situated creditors since vendors of
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goods will be treated differently than other creditors providing
value to the debtor during the 20-day period preceding the filing of
the case.
Id. at 503-79 and 503-80.
Apart from this dichotomy in treatment, in enacting this provision,
Congress failed to take into consideration other ramifications that this
section would have on the bankruptcy process.
The adoption of this provision, in essence, has created a new con-
stituent at the bargaining table - the Section 503(b)(9) claimants. The
first days of a Chapter 11 case were already difficult and complicated
enough for a debtor, in terms of obtaining financing and approval to
use cash collateral and maintaining the flow of goods and services.
Now, that process has been further complicated and exacerbated by
the creation of this new class of creditor. Issues such as (i) who is
entitled to assert a 503(b)(9) claim; (ii) how and when is the claim
asserted; (iii) may 503(b)(9) claimants compel immediate payment of
their claims; (vi) what defenses may be asserted against payment of
such claims; (iv) whether an unsecured creditors' committee should
align itself with the interests of the 503(b)(9) claimants; and (v)
whether the U.S. Trustee can be compelled to form a 503(b)(9) com-
mittee, are but a few of the many questions that are now being raised,
addressed, and analyzed in Chapter 11 cases.
II. WHAT IS A 503(b)(9) CLAIM?
The time for making a reclamation demand under Section 546(c) of
the Code has been expanded under BAPCPA from 10 days to 45 days
if the debtor received goods from a creditor while insolvent. A writ-
ten request must be made to the debtor identifying the goods subject
to reclamation within 45 days after the date of receipt of such goods.
Alternatively, if such time period expires after the petition is filed,
then the request must be made no later than 20 days after the petition
date. Notwithstanding a creditor's failure to make a written demand
for reclamation, Section 546(c)(2) nonetheless entitles the creditor to
seek allowance of an administrative expense claim for a portion of
goods delivered to a debtor during the 20 days preceding the filing of
the debtor's bankruptcy petition under Section 503(b)(9).
Section 503(b)(9) provides:
(b) After notice and a hearing, there shall be allowed administra-
tive expense, other than claims allowed under section 502(f) of
this title, including -
(9) the value of any goods received by the debtor within 20
days before the date of commencement of a case under this
503(b)(9) CLAIMANTS
title in which the goods have been sold to the debtor in the
ordinary course of such debtor's business.
11 U.S.C. § 503(b)(9).
By its express terms, Section 503(b)(9) only applies to "goods" (not
"services") provided to a debtor within 20 days prior to the com-
mencement of the case. "Goods" is not defined in Section 503(b)(9)
and, thus, what is ultimately determined to be "goods" may be subject
to litigation. For example: is a part or tooling that has been signifi-
cantly altered by a creditor a "good" or "service" when it is provided
to the debtor? Courts may look to the definition of "goods" con-
tained in Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code ("UCC") for
purposes of defining what falls within the scope of Section 503(b)(9).
COLLIER'S ON BANKRUPTCY 503.16[1] at 503-79-80 (15th rev. ed.).
See also U.C.C. § 9-102(44).4 Query, whether the manner in which
the invoice refers to what was shipped to the debtor impacts whether
the item for which 503(b)(9) treatment is being sought will be ac-
corded that classification? While the writing on the invoice may be a
starting point for the analysis and evidence of the parties' intent, nev-
ertheless, it is likely to be subject to rebuttal and contested by other
parties-in-interest.
Moreover, Section 503(b)(9) does not specifically provide that the
goods shipped by the creditor must remain unpaid to qualify for treat-
ment under Section 503(b)(9); to hold otherwise would create a wind-
fall for the creditor. This Section also does not delineate how the
claim is to be calculated. Presumably, the invoice price of the goods
(exclusive of interest, freight or other charges) would be the applica-
ble amount in valuing the claim, so long as it represents the price that
was ordinarily used between the parties.
4. Section 9-102(44) defines "goods" as:
... all things that are movable when a security interest attaches. The term includes (i)
fixtures, (ii) standing timber that is to be cut and removed under a conveyance or con-
tract for sale, (iii) the unborn young of animals, (iv) crops grown, growing, or to be
grown, even if the crops are produced on trees, vines, or bushes, and (v) manufactured
homes. The term also includes a computer program embedded in goods and any sup-
porting information provided in connection with a transaction relating to the program
if (i) the program is associated with the goods in such a manner that it customarily is
considered part of the goods, or (ii) by becoming the owner of the goods, a person
acquires a right to use the program in connection with the goods. The term does not
include a computer program embedded in goods that consists solely of the medium in
which the program is embedded. The term also does not include accounts, chattel pa-
per, commercial tort claims, deposit accounts, documents, general intangibles, instru-
ments, investment property, letter-of-credit rights, letters of credit, money, or oil, gas,
or other minerals before extraction.
2007]
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III. How AND WHEN DOES ONE ASSERT A 503(b)(9) CLAIM?
Early in bankruptcy cases, the courts establish a bar date for the
filing of unsecured claims. These notices, however, typically do not
establish bar dates for the filing of administrative claims. Moreover, it
is well settled that an administrative claimant, if it feels its claim is
going unpaid, must file a motion with the court for allowance and pay-
ment of its claim. There is no current Code or Bankruptcy Rule that
provides for the assertion of administrative claims through the proof
of claim process.
Most debtors are fully aware of their traditional administrative obli-
gations, as those obligations are incurred voluntarily by a debtor post-
petition. Section 503(b)(9) claims are different, in that they are a sub-
set of a debtor's pre-petition unsecured debt and must be asserted in
order to be elevated to be accorded administrative priority. If a
debtor does not know the extent and nature of such claims, it makes it
very difficult for a debtor to propose a plan that satisfies the confirma-
tion requirement that administrative claims be paid in full. See e.g.,
Section 1129(a)(9)(A) of the Code.
To address these concerns, some courts are enacting local rules to
create bar dates for the filing of Section 503(b)(9) administrative
claims. See e.g., Local Bankruptcy Rule 3002-1, United States Bank-
ruptcy Court for the District of Massachusetts, that requires that cred-
itors asserting administrative expense claims pursuant to Section
503(b)(9) must file them in writing with the Court within 60 days of
the first date set for the meeting of creditors pursuant to Section 341,
unless the court orders otherwise. If a creditor fails to file such a re-
quest within this specified period, the creditor will lose the right to
assert administrative expense treatment for such claim. Other courts
are establishing bar dates for the submission of administrative expense
claims as part of the initial scheduling order in a case. See In re Ward
Prod., LLC, Case No. 06-50527 (TJT) (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 2006) (in
this scheduling order, in addition to setting a bar date, the Court clari-
fied that the filing of a proof of claim, as opposed to a motion, would
be sufficient for asserting an administrative claim). Another option is
for a debtor to seek to establish a bar date by motion or, alternatively,
to provide a bar date and mechanism for asserting such claims as part
of a plan. Creditors having such claims must carefully read the notices
they receive to ensure that they timely and properly follow the proce-
dures for asserting 503(b)(9) claims. Otherwise they risk losing the
right to assert such claims.
[Vol. 5:487
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IV. CAN A 503(b)(9) CLAIMANT COMPEL IMMEDIATE PAYMENT?
As stated above, generally, an administrative claim is asserted by
the filing of a motion seeking allowance, and sometimes immediate
payment, of the claim unless the local rules or a scheduling order pro-
vide otherwise. While Section 503(b) provides that an administrative
creditor may request payment of its claim, it does not provide any
specific mechanism regarding when such claim must be paid. Prior to
the adoption of Section 503(b)(9), the courts generally held that the
timing for payment of an administrative expense claim was left to the
sound discretion of the court. In re Photo Promotion Assocs., Inc.,
881 F.2d 6, 9 (2d Cir. 1989). However, Section 1129(a)(9)(A) of the
Code sets an outside date for payment of administrative expense
claims, requiring that they be paid in cash, in an amount equal to the
allowed amount of such claim, on the effective date of any plan of
reorganization, unless creditors agree to different treatment.
Nevertheless, in some recent cases, 503(b)(9) claimants have filed
motions early in the case, and well before any plan has been filed,
seeking immediate payment of their claims. See e.g., In re Bookbind-
ers' Rest., Inc., 2006 WL 3858020 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 2006); In re Global
Homes, Inc., 2006 Bankr. LEXIS 3608 (Bankr. D. Del. 2006). In both
of these cases, the claimants expressed concern that if they were not
paid immediately, in pari passu with the other ordinary course post-
petition expenses, there might not be sufficient funds at the end of the
case to pay them in full. Claimants have also argued that immediate
payment is required because: (i) the goods they provided were being
used by the debtor and were necessary and essential to the debtor's
ability to continue its business operations; (ii) by paying other post-
petition trade creditors, the debtor was treating similar claims differ-
ently, i.e., an "equal protection" argument; and (iii) the debtor had
sufficient cash to pay such claims. Despite these concerns, in each of
the recent cases, the courts denied requests for immediate payment of
the 503(b)(9) claims because: (i) there was no statutory requirement
that compelled immediate payment; and (ii) payment of such claims
would interfere with the debtor's cash flow and business operations.
In neither of these cases, however, did the Court make a finding of
administrative insolvency.
According to Judge Frank in the Bookbinders' Restaurant case:
There is nothing in the language of § 503(b)(9) to support Blue
Crab's suggestion that it is entitled to immediate payment of its al-
lowed expense in derogation of the accepted principle that the tim-
ing of payment of an allowed administrative expense is within the
court's discretion. Section 503(b)(9) does nothing more than define
2007]
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a type of liability, previously treated as a prepetition claim, which is
now accorded administrative expense status. The text of
§ 503(b)(9) neither states nor even implies that allowance of the ex-
pense encompasses an unqualified right to immediate payment.
Nor does the text of the provision suggest that an administrative
expense allowed under § 503(b)(9) is to be treated in a more
favorable manner than any other allowed § 503(b) administrative
expense.
In re Bookbinders' Rest., Inc., 2006 WL 3858020 at *4. Moreover, the
Court indicated that it was not aware of the existence of any legisla-
tive history that supported the claimant's argument for immediate
payment. Id. at *4 n.14. The Court did recognize, however, that
"there may be circumstances in which it would be inequitable or inap-
propriate to permit a debtor to pay certain administrative expenses
but not others." Id. at *5.
Moreover, while not yet fully articulated in these cases, there seems
to be a difference between requiring a debtor to promptly pay for
post-petition goods and services it receives post-petition and requiring
immediate payment for goods provided pre-petition for which the
Code has now created an administrative priority. The Court in the
Bookbinders' Restaurant case suggests that part of the statutory basis
justifying the disparate treatment accorded creditors that supply
goods post-petition, versus those entitled to Section 503(b)(9) priority,
is Section 363(c)(1). The Court noted that those creditors that are
providing goods post-petition are being paid for such goods pursuant
to Section 363(c)(1), not Section 503(b)(1), and thus, "the expenses
are being paid without the formality of court allowance under
§ 503(b)." Id.
Finally, the Court in Bookbinders' Restaurant rejected the notion
that 503(b)(9) claimants be paid immediately on the basis of landlords
having such a right under Section 365(d)(3). Neither the text of the
various statutory provisions nor the legislative history supported im-
mediate payment on this basis. According to the Court: ". . . [H]ad
Congress intended to provide § 503(b)(9) claimants with some type of
enhanced right to payment after allowance of the expense, I am con-
vinced that it would have made its intent express in the statute and it
has not done so." Id. at *6. Moreover, legislative policy associated
with the enactment of this provision would not trump the otherwise
clear and unambiguous language on the basis of rules of statutory
construction.
The Court in In re Global Home Prods., LLC, 2006 Bankr. LEXIS
3608 (Bankr. D. Del. 2006) was equally unpersuaded that 503(b)(9)
claimants receive immediate payment of their claims. In denying the
[Vol. 5:487
503(b)(9) CLAIMANTS
requested relief, the Court indicated that the primary factor consid-
ered by the Court is an orderly and equal distribution among creditors
and preventing a race to the debtor's assets. As such, according to the
Court:
Distributions to administrative creditors are generally disallowed
prior to confirmation if there is a showing that the bankruptcy es-
tate may not be able to pay all of the administrative expenses in full.
Courts will also consider the particular needs of each administrative
claimant and the length and expense of the case's administration.
Id. at *11 (citing In re HQ Global Holdings, Inc., 282 B.R. 169 (Bankr.
D. Del. 2002) (citations omitted). Moreover, the Court indicated that
absent demonstrating a necessity to pay, as opposed to the ability of
the debtor to pay, an administrative claimant is not entitled to the
exceptional remedy of immediate payment. Id. (citing In re Cont'l
Airlines, Inc., 146 B.R. 520, 531 (Bankr. D. Del. 1992), In re Iono-
sphere Clubs, Inc., 98 B.R., 174, 179 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y 1989); Alan N.
Resnick, The Future of Chapter 11: A Symposium Cosponsored by the
American College of Bankruptcy: The Future of the Doctrine of Neces-
sity and Critical Vendor Payments in Chapter 11 Cases, 47 B.C.L. Rev.
183, 205 (2005) ("Section 503(b)(9) 'is a rule of priority, rather than
payment.' The new section does not specify when payment will be
made. 'Arguably, prepetition vendor claims are never payable in the
ordinary course of business because of the intervening bankruptcy and
the automatic stay, even if afforded administrative expense
priority.' ")).
Ultimately, in denying immediate payment to the 503(b)(9) claim-
ant, the Global Home Products Court relied on the 3-prong test ar-
ticulated in In re Garden Ridge Corp., 323 B.R. 136, 143 (Bankr. D.
Del. 2005), to wit: (i) the prejudice to the debtors; (ii) hardship to the
claimant; and (iii) potential detriment to other creditors. In applying
each of these factors, Judge Gross denied the relief sought. First, the
claimant had not submitted any evidence of hardship other than its
self-serving conclusory statements. Moreover, according to the debt-
ors, there was no evidence that failure to pay this claim would put the
claimant out of business - thus, in essence, attempting to analogize
the 503(b)(9) claimant to a critical vendor. Second, the debtors
presented testimony that they would suffer substantial hardship in
their reorganization effort if immediate payment was required. In bal-
ancing the relative hardships to the parties, the Court had little diffi-
culty in finding that the balance tipped in favor of the debtors.
Clearly, the bar for 503(b)(9) claimants establishing a right to immedi-
ate payment has been set very high.
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While Section 503(b)(9) appears to enhance the position of the
creditor that has provided goods to the debtor within the 20 days prior
to the commencement of the case, the actual benefit to be derived by
the creditor may be illusory, at best. If the creditor is unable to com-
pel immediate payment of its 503(b)(9) claim and the case is subse-
quently rendered administratively insolvent, it is unlikely that the
creditor will receive payment on its claim. Moreover, there is no re-
quirement that the lender fund the payment of such claims. If the
administrative claimants are unwilling to accept less than full payment
on their claims at confirmation, the debtor will not be able to propose
and confirm a plan.
When faced with an administratively insolvent case, 503(b)(9)
claimants may have as their only viable option to trigger payment of
their administrative claims the filing of a motion to dismiss or convert
the case under Section 1112 of the Code. Nevertheless, obtaining dis-
missal or conversion is not likely to result in payment of such claims
unless there is some benefit to be achieved by liquidating the case
through Chapter 11. If such circumstances exist, then dismissal or
conversion may provide 503(b)(9) claimants with the ability to lever-
age their position to compel payment of their claims in the early
stages of the case.
V. Is THE RETURN OF ALL PREFERENTIAL PAYMENTS A
PREREQUISITE TO ALLOWANCE AND PAYMENT OF A
503(b)(9) CLAIM?
Questions have been raised whether allowance and payment of an
administrative expense claim asserted under Section 503(b)(9) of the
Code may be defeated based on the creditor having received and
failed to return preferential payments made by a debtor within the 90
days prior to the filing of the petition. Section 502(d) of the Code
generally requires the return of all preferential transfers as a prerequi-
site to claim allowance. It provides:
(d) Notwithstanding subsections (a) and (b) of this section, the
court shall disallow any claim of an entity from which property is
recoverable under Section 542, 543, 550, or 553 of this title or that is
a transferee of a transfer avoidable under Section 522(f), 522(h),
544, 545, 547, 548, 549 or 724(a) of this title, unless such entity or
transferee has paid the amount, or turned over any such property,
for which such entity, or transferee is liable under Section 522(i),
542, 543, 550 or 553 of this title.
11 U.S.C. § 502(d).
According to Collier's:
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Section 502(d) of the Bankruptcy Code requires disallowance of a
claim of a transferee of a voidable transfer in toto if the transferee
has not paid the amount or turned over the property received as
required under the sections under which the transferee's liability
arises.... Once the liability of the transferee has been determined,
the claim interposed by the transferee will be disallowed unless such
transferee gives effect to the judgment flowing from the exercise of
the powers described above.
COLLIER'S ON BANKRUPTCY 502.05[1] at 502-56 and 502-57 (15th
rev. ed.).
Moreover, "[t]he legislative history and policy behind Section
502(d) illustrates that the section is intended to have the coercive ef-
fect of ensuring compliance with judicial orders." In re Davis, 889
F.2d 658, 661 (5th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 495 U.S. 933 (1990). Thus,
creditors who have received a voidable transfer, irrespective of
whether they have filed a proof of claim, will not be able to participate
in a distribution from the estate until the improperly transferred prop-
erty is surrendered to the estate. COLLIER'S ON BANKRUPTCY
502.05[2] at 502-57.
However, there is a split of authority in the cases over whether an
administrative claim (as opposed to an unsecured claim) is subject to
Section 502(d). No court, however, has considered the issue to date in
the context of a § 503(b)(9) claim. See In re Triple Star Welding, Inc.,
324 B.R. 778 (B.A.P 9th Cir. 2005) (Section 502(d) applies to adminis-
trative expense claims); MicroAge, Inc. v. Viewsonic Corp. (In re
MicroAge, Inc.), 291 B.R. 503, 508 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 2002) (Section
502(d)) may be raised in response to the allowance of an administra-
tive expense claim; the definition of a "claim" in Section 101(5) is
broad enough to include administrative expenses and Section 502(d)
does not include any language to qualify such definition; policy behind
Section 502(d), to encourage transferees to return avoidable transfers
to estate, supports result); In re Georgia Steel, Inc., 38 B.R. 829, 839-
40 (Bankr. M.D. Ga. 1984) (holding that Section 502(d) applies to pre-
vent payment of any part of administrative expenses due a creditor
until preferential property transferred is recovered). Contra In re Lids
Corp., 260 B.R. 680, 683 (Bankr. D. Del. 2001) ("administrative ex-
pense claims are accorded special treatment under the Bankruptcy
Code and thus, are not subject to Section 502(d)"); Camelot Music,
Inc. v. MHW Advertising & Public Relations, Inc. (In re CM Hold-
ings, Inc.), 264 B.R. 141, 158 (Bankr. D. Del 2000) (because adminis-
trative claim did not arise prepetition, it is not a claim under §101(10),
and thus, Section 502(d) does not apply).
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Moreover, in some cases it has been argued that if a creditor is
granted and paid an allowed administrative expense claim, the
amount paid should not be able to be used as "new value" in defend-
ing a subsequent preference action. To allow otherwise would, in es-
sence, be giving the creditor a windfall. Contra Boyd v. The Water
Doctor (In re Check Reporting Servs.), Inc., 140 B.R. 425 (Bankr.
W.D. Mich. 1992) (transfer does not have to remain unpaid to qualify
for new value).
VI. DOES THE COMMITTEE REPRESENT THE INTERESTS OF
503(b)(9) CLAIMANTS AS PART OF ITS CONSTITUENCY
AND FIDUCIARY OBLIGATIONS?
Prior to the enactment of BAPCPA, a committee was generally ho-
mogeneous and was comprised only of creditors holding unsecured
claims. As such, their goal of maximizing the value of the assets and
securing the greatest return for the unsecured creditors as a whole was
relatively easy to address and achieve among the members of the com-
mittee. However, now with the adoption of Section 503(b)(9), a com-
mittee is often comprised of two types of creditors - those solely with
unsecured claims and those with both unsecured and Section
503(b)(9) claims. Moreover, often times, the 503(b)(9) claimants con-
stitute a significant majority of the committee. As a result, the goals
of the various members are not necessarily consistent and aligned and,
have often prompted questions regarding who the committee repre-
sents and what responsibilities and actions the committee must take to
fulfill and satisfy its fiduciary duties. For example, should a committee
actively seek to limit the amount of 503(b)(9) claims, as it would with
any type of administrative claim, to maximize the possible return to
unsecured creditors? The issue becomes particularly focused when, as
often is the case, there are insufficient assets to pay both groups of
creditors in full.
Section 1102(b)(1) of the Code directs the U.S. Trustee to appoint a
committee of creditors consisting of persons willing to serve, holding
the seven largest claims against the debtor, and are representative of
the different kinds of claims to be presented. The duties of the com-
mittee are set forth in Section 1103 of the Code and include, among
other things, consulting with the debtor about the administration of
the case, investigating the acts, conduct, assets, liabilities and financial
condition of the debtor and its operations, and the desirability of con-
tinuing such business and participating in the formulation of a plan.
11 U.S.C. § 1103(c). Overlaying these specific statutory duties is the
[Vol. 5:487
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general duty of the committee to maximize the value of the assets for
the benefit of the unsecured creditors of the estate.
A. To Whom Does a Committee Owe a Fiduciary Duty?
Generally, the case law requires a committee to act in the best inter-
est of its constituency - i.e., the unsecured creditors - and pursue that
fiduciary duty. The clearest statement of the rule is:
In general, the purpose of such committees is to represent the inter-
ests of unsecured creditors and to strive to maximize the bankruptcy
dividend paid to the class of creditors. See, e.g., In re Haskell-
Dawes, Inc., 188 B.R. 515, 519 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1995).
In re Nationwide Sports Distribs., Inc., 227 B.R. 455, 463 (Bankr. E.D.
Pa. 1998).
The duty is to maximize the return to the entire class, not for partic-
ular segments of that class. According to the Court in In re Tucker
Freight Lines, Inc., 62 B.R. 213, 216 (Bankr. W.D. Mich. 1986):
The Bankruptcy Code contemplates a significant and central role
for committees in the scheme of a business reorganization. In re
Penn-Dixie Indus., Inc., 9 B.R. 941, 944 (S.D.N.Y. 1981). Official
committees appointed under § 1102 are empowered under
§ 1003(c)(3) to participate in the formulation of a plan, [and] advise
those represented by such committee of such committee's determi-
nations as to any plan formulated.... While there is "implied in this
grant of authority ... a fiduciary duty" to committee constituents,
there is at the same time "an implicit grant of limited immunity."
In re Tucker Freight Lines, Inc., 62 B.R. at 216.
The duty extends to the class as a whole, not to individual members.
As the Court indicated:
Counsel for the.., committee do not represent any individual cred-
itor's interest in [a] case; they were retained to represent the en-
tire... class. Therefore, counsel for the creditors' committee do not
owe a duty to [one creditor] to maximize its interest at the expense
of the remaining creditors in the represented class.
In re Drexel Burnham Lambert Group, Inc., 138 B.R. 717 (Bankr.
S.D.N.Y. 1992); see also, In re Levy, 54 B.R. 805, 807 (Bankr.
S.D.N.Y. 1985).
The principle that a committee owes a duty to all and only all of the
general unsecured creditors is implicitly recognized in varying con-
texts. Thus, a committee member will be removed if his efforts to
establish his own individual rights may result in a lesser distribution to
the unsecured creditor class as a whole.
Members of the Committee also have another duty - a fiduciary
duty to all creditors represented by the committee .... If [the com-
mittee member] is successful in the trust fund litigation it would
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have a substantial negative impact on the prospects of a distribution
to unsecured creditors in these bankruptcy cases.... [Its] aggressive
efforts to establish its secured status could seriously undermine the
Committee's effort on behalf of the unsecured creditors....
In re Fas Mart Convenience Stores, Inc., 265 B.R. 427, 432 (Bankr.
E.D. Va. 2001).
Moreover, the courts assume that the committee's duty is to maxi-
mize the recovery for the class as a whole and not to any individual
members, or group of members of the class.
In the case of reorganization committees, these fiduciary duties are
crucial because of the importance of committees. Reorganization
committees are the primary negotiating bodies for the plan of reor-
ganization. They represent those classes of creditors from which
they are selected. They also provide supervision of the debtor and
execute an oversight function in protecting their constituent's inter-
ests. See H.R. Rep. No. 95-595, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 401 (1977),
U.S. Code Cong. & Admin. News, p. 5787.
In re Johns-Manville Corp., 26 B.R. 919, 925 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1983).
Based on the foregoing, one can certainly make the argument that a
committee's duties extend to its unsecured constituents only. Thus,
any support for allowance or payment of higher priority administra-
tive claims would be in direct conflict with the committee's fiduciary
duties, even if a subset of its constituents may benefit from such claim
allowance and payment. The analysis is similar to a committee's
stance on allowance and payment of reclamation claims that would
diminish the overall return to unsecured creditors.
B. If Section 503(b)(9) Claimants' Interests are not Represented by
the Unsecured Creditors' Committee, Do the Section 503(b)(9)
Claimants Have the Right to Form Their Own Committee?
Recognizing that 503(b)(9) claimants are required to generally act
individually and not as part of an organized group in seeking allow-
ance and payment of their claims: should 503(b)(9) claimants be enti-
tled to their own committee to pursue payment of their claims on a
collective basis? In some instances, 503(b)(9) claimants are attempt-
ing to formally organize, requesting the U.S. Trustee to appoint a
503(b)(9) committee. See, e.g., In re Pine River Plastics, Inc., Case
No. 07-42010-PJS (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 2007) (503(b)(9) claimants re-
signed from the Committee and were unsuccessful in their unofficial
attempt to cause the U.S. Trustee to appoint a 503(b)(9) committee).
While 503(b)(9) committees are not specifically provided for under
the Code, the U.S. Trustee has discretion to appoint such a committee.
Section 1102(a)(1) of the Code permits appointment of "such addi-
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tional committees of creditors ... as the United States trustee deems
appropriate." Id. Having a formal committee of 503(b)(9) claimants
may make it easier to negotiate and resolve the allowance and imme-
diate payment claims of such creditors. On the other hand, authoriz-
ing such a committee will increase the administrative fees and costs of
a Chapter 11 - a committee formed under the auspices of Section 1102
has the right to hire counsel and other professionals whose fees are
paid by the estate. Absent formation of a committee, the costs and
expenses for pursuing payment of such claims would fall on each of
the individual 503(b)(9) claimants. Resources available to debtors to
fund such expenses are scarce at best, in most cases. Moreover, lend-
ers are reluctant or unwilling to carve out additional funds for pay-
ment of another layer of professional fees. Furthermore, these
claimants are more likely to be able to protect themselves without the
necessity of a committee. Thus, it is unlikely that the U.S. Trustee will
appoint a committee solely for 503(b)(9) claimants.
C. Does a Committee Violate its Fiduciary Duties by Negotiating
for a Carve-Out for Payment of General Unsecured Claims, or
Does it Have a Duty to Ensure that the Bankruptcy Code's
"Waterfall Priority Scheme" is Fully Respected?
It is becoming more common for committees to seek to carve-out
from the secured creditors' collateral an assigned dividend for the
benefit of unsecured creditors. By utilizing the carve-out mechanism,
a committee is necessarily seeking to bypass other higher priority
creditor classes who would otherwise take first from a debtor's assets
under the waterfall priority scheme set forth in the Code. Because
503(b)(9) claimants are usually present on a committee in their dual
creditor status role, such creditors are privy to discussions by a com-
mittee regarding carve-out strategies. Whether such committee mem-
bers must recuse themselves or be excused from such discussions is
certainly not well settled, let alone addressed in the case law.
The 503(b)(9) claimants often suggest that the committee is re-
quired to get the best deal that it can for the creditors as a whole. On
the other hand, each dollar that goes to pay a 503(b)(9) allowed claim
takes funds away from the general unsecured creditor pool. Is the
committee required to negotiate a carve-out for the benefit of the es-
tate as a whole (at least inclusive of 503(b)(9) claims), or merely for
the payment of unsecured claims? Put another way, is the committee
required to ensure that the Chapter 11 process is being used for the
purposes consistent with the Code?
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First, it would appear that a committee would not be deemed to
have violated its fiduciary duties if it adopts a position supportive of
the Code's requirements generally. In In re Cent. Med. Ctr., Inc., 122
B.R. 568 (Bankr. E.D. Mo. 1990), the Committee objected to certain
provisions of a plan and an opposing party argued that since the ob-
jection did not run directly to the benefit of the unsecured creditors,
but instead addressed other plan terms that violated the Bankruptcy
Code, the Committee should be deemed to have overstepped its
bounds and its objection should be ignored. The Court disagreed and
permitted the Committee to pursue its objections, stating:
Finally, this Court believes that as part of upholding its fiduciary
responsibilities to its constituents, a committee has both a duty and
an obligation to raise objections to any provision of a plan it deems
violative of Section 1129(a) [of the Code]. For example, an individ-
ual class constituent may ratify the economic treatment it receives
under a given plan of reorganization. However, the plan may violate
one of the subsections of Section 1129(a). This Court believes that
in such a case, a committee has a duty to object to the Plan. Thus,
for these three reasons this Court concludes that the Committee has
standing to raise its objections to Proponents' Plan pursuant to Sec-
tion 1129(a).
Id. at 571.
Alternatively, at least one court has held that a committee would
not be deemed to have violated its fiduciary duties if it negotiates for a
carve-out solely for the benefit of the general unsecured creditors.
The question of carve outs and "gifting" by a secured creditor was
addressed by the Court in Official Unsecured Creditors' Committee v.
Stern (In re SPM Mfg. Corp.), 984 F.2d 1305 (1st Cir. 1993). In that
case, the Court held generally that an under-secured lender with a
conclusively determined and uncontested "perfected, first security in-
terest" in all of a debtor's assets may through a settlement, "share" or
"gift" some of those proceeds to junior, general unsecured creditors,
even though priority unsecured creditors (i.e. taxing authorities) will
go unpaid. In response to the argument by certain priority unsecured
creditors that the committee breached its fiduciary duties by carving
out a distribution only for the general unsecured creditors, the Court
stated:
• . . The Code expressly authorizes a committee to "perform such
other services as are in the interest of those represented." 11 U.S.C.
§ 1103(c)(5). Appellees also concede that the Committee's appoint-
ment, pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 1102(a) charged it only with represen-
tation of the general, unsecured creditors (not with representation
of the I.R.S. or other priority creditors). Nevertheless, they con-
tend, any agreement negotiated by the Committee should have
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been negotiated to benefit the estate as a whole and thus any con-
tractual right to receive payment from Citizens rightfully belongs to
them....
We do not accept this contention, as it seems based on the errone-
ous assumption that the Official Unsecured Creditors' Committee is
a fiduciary for the estate as a whole. While a creditors' committee
and its members must act in accordance with the provisions of the
Bankruptcy Code and with proper regard for the bankruptcy court;
the committee is a fiduciary for those whom it represents, not for
the debtor or the estate generally. In re Microboard Processing,
Inc., 95 B.R. 283, 285 (Bankr. D.Conn. 1989). Thus the committee's
fiduciary duty, as such, runs to the parties or class it represents.
Markey v. Orr, 1990 WL 483808 at *4 (W.D. Mich. 1990). It is
charged with pursing whatever lawful course best serves the interests
of the class of creditors represented. In this case, the Committee rea-
sonably determined that entering into the Agreement with Citizens
was in the best interests of the class it represented.
In re SPM Mfg. Corp., 984 F.2d at 1316 (emphasis added). See also In
re World Health Alternatives, Inc., 344 B.R. 291 (Bankr. D.Del. 2006)
(court approved settlement of committee's objections to sale and fi-
nancing motions that provided, among other things, for a carve-out of
the lender's collateral to the unsecured creditors under which priority
unsecured creditors would not be paid as not violating the absolute
prioiity rule; because the proposed settlement was being made outside
the context of a plan, the absolute priority rule was not applicable);
contra, Motorola, Inc. v. Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors,
et. al (In re Armstrong World Indus., Inc.), 432 F.3d 507 (3rd Cir.
2005) (court refused to confirm a plan that provided for issuance and
distribution of warrants to equity over the objection of the unsecured
creditors where the plan provided that the subject warrants would be
transferred by class 7 creditors to equity if class 6 creditors objected to
the plan as violating the absolute priority rule because equity would
be receiving or retaining property when all senior classes were not
being paid in full under the plan); In re Iridium, Operating L.L.C., 478
F.3d 452 (2d Cir. 2007) (court refused to approve settlement whereby
secured creditor proposed to "gift" proceeds of its claim to unsecured
creditors because it violated the absolute priority rule that requires
administrative and priority creditors to be paid in full before un-
secured creditors are paid on their claims and suggested that (i) the
committee owes a duty to all the creditors of the estate, and (ii) the
absolute priority rule and its application needs to be considered even
in the context of a Rule 9019 settlement being proffered outside con-
firmation of a plan).
2007]
502 DEPAUL BUSINESS & COMMERCIAL LAW JOURNAL
The SPM decision, while known for its groundbreaking approval of
"gifting" by secured creditors to lower class creditors, is equally
groundbreaking in its approval of a committee's actions which were
expressly detrimental to an assumed subset of its constituency, priority
unsecured creditors, in favor of another subset of its constituency,
general unsecured creditors. While the SPM decision appears to be
one of the few decisions, to date, to ratify this departure from a gen-
eral fiduciary duty concept, the holding in SPM seems equally applica-
ble to a committee's efforts to extract a benefit for general unsecured
creditors to the detriment of 503(b)(9) claimants. Whether that anal-
ogy will hold true in other courts has yet to be seen.
VII. CONCLUSION
It is unlikely that Congress envisioned that all of these ancillary is-
sues would arise from the creation of a new administrative class of
creditors. Unfortunately, because BAPCPA is relatively new, there is
little case law to provide guidance on how to deal with these issues.
Hopefully, over time, as more of these issues reach the courts, credi-
tors will be provided with more guidance and better benchmarks for
addressing and dealing with the 503(b)(9) claimants - the new constit-
uent, a/k/a the "500 Pound Gorilla," at the table.
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